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On 26 October 1993 the LiberalPart~ of Canada, under the leadershlp of Jean Chretien, won a
decisive victory in Canadian national
elections. The Liberals, in what many
observers regard as the most important
federal electoral results since the
founding of Canada in 1867, captured
a majority (177 of 295) of the seats in
the House of Commons. The election
also marked the rise of two recent, al-
beit former marginal parties to promi-
nence: the pro-Quebec independence
party, the Bloc Quebecois (now the of-
ficial opposition with 54 seats), and the
Reform Party (52 seats). The Progres-
sive Conservative Party, having ruled
Canada since 1984 under the tutelage
of Brian Mulroney and then Kim
Campbell, were able to capture but 2
seats in the House (from a pre-election
total of 153 seats). It was, in the words
of The New York Times, "the most pun-
ishing blow to any governing party in
Canadian political history." The aver-
age Canadian had finally soured on the
nine year performance put forth by the
Progressive Conservative party.
The mandate given by Canadian vot-
ers to Prime Minister Jean Chretien and
his fellow Liberal Party members was
clear: change was demanded. The Lib-
erals were expected, in short, to be the
necessary political instrument to imple-
ment a broad range of reforms. In the
course of the election campaign, candi-
date Chretien proposed new initiatives
targeted both at the domestic and inter~
national arenas, that a Liberal govern-
ment would introduce as legislation.
The purpose of this article is two-
fold: to examine some of the most
pressing issues that have, over the past
several months, confronted the
Chretien government; and, to specifi-
cally review the corresponding policy
measures taken by the Liberals in or-
der to address these national concerns.
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THE DOMESTIC ARENA
Since reconvening Parliament on 17
January 1994, three distinct areas have
demanded the bulk of the Liberal
government's attention: the health of the
Canadian economy; charting a new
course in federal-provincial relations'
and the unresolved status of Canadia~
federalism - i.e., "the Quebec question."
Ottawa's plan for addressing the in-
terrelated economic issues of growth
the national deficit (projected to b~
$41.2 billion for 1994-1995), the na-
tional debt (projected to reach $550
billion by the close of 1994), and na-
tional unemployment (11.2% on aver-
age in 1993), was most fully revealed
on 22 February 1994 when Paul Mar-
tin, Minister of Finance, presented the
federal budget before the House of
Commons. The eagerly awaited an-
nouncement included a commitment
to job creation (principally through a
series of capital funding proposals), a
plan to gradually reduce Canada's bur-
geoning national deficit (by amounts
of $1.5 billion for 1994-1995, and by
$5.1 billion for 1995-1996), and a limit
to government expenditures (by freez-
ing spending for 1994-1995 and 1995-
1996, at the 1992-1993 level of $122.5
billion). Ottawa is also preparing to
soon introduce legislation before
Parliament to substantially revise
Canada's $40 billion social assistance
network, as well as longstanding agri-
cultural support programs (the corner-
stone of which is the $560 million fed-
eral grain transportation subsidy).
On the subject of federal-provincial
relations - an area that had largely
come to be dominated by attempts to
broker deals between competing pro-
vincial interests during the Mulroney/
Campbell years - the Chretien gov-
ernment swiftly moved to interject a
pragmatic, business-like approach de-
fined in terms of the national interest.
Convening a meeting of federal and
provincial leaders on 21 December
-
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1993, Prime Minister Chretien and the
premiers agreed to a number of items.
The list includes a cost sharing formula
for financing a $6 billion national in-
frastructure program (the focus of
which is to repair and/or replace roads,
sewer systems, etc... ); a new five year
package for financial transfer payments
from Ottawa to the provincial capitals;
joint examination of how to revise and,
if necessary, replace social assistance
programs; an attempt to eliminate the
cumbersome interprovincial trade bar-
rier network (an agreement was
reached in July 1994); a move to re-
place the federally imposed goods and
services tax (i.e., the CST); and, a com-
mitment to harmonize federal and pro-
vincial consumption tax levels as
quickly as possible. In commenting on
Ottawa's attempt to reshape the fed-
eral-provincial relationship, Marcel
Masse, Minister of Intergovernmental
Affairs and Public Service Renewal,
noted: "Mr. Chretien clearly wants first
ministers conferences to be used as
instruments where the first ministers
are not looking at their own specific
interests, but rather at a national in-
terest." This perspective has to date
been welcomed by the majority of pre-
miers, if only because it represents a
clear departure from the tone of fed-
eral-provincial relations since 1984. As
Bob Rae, Premier of Ontario stated at
the conclusion of the initial federal-
provincial summit: "there was hardly
any bullshit."
Quebec's status - as a continuing
member in, or potentially independent
of, the Canadian federation - may
well prove to be Ottawa's most severe
political test in the immediate future.
The governing Liberal Party in Que-
bec City, led by pro-federalist Premier
Daniel Johnson (Johnson ran uncon-
tested at the 14 December 1993 pro-
vincialleadership convention, thereby
filling the vacancy created by the res-
ignation of ailing Premier Robert
Bourassa), was recently defeated in the
12 September 1994 provincial election
by the pro-independence Parti Quebe-
cois. The Parti Quebecois, who man-
aged to win 77 of 125 seats in the Que-
bec National Assembly, have repeatedly
pledged - under the leadership of
Jacques Parizeau - to hold, within a
period of 8 to 10 months, a provincial
referendum on the issue of whether
Quebec should separate from Canada.
Clearly Prime Minister Chretien
would unreservedly preferred to have
seen Daniel Johnson triumph. This
would have squashed, at least tempo-
rarily, any attempt on the part of Que-
bec to formally secede from the Cana-
dian union. More importantly, it would
have provided Ottawa with an oppor-
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tunity - i.e., a four year period - to
fashion a successful political arrange-
ment (unlike the Meech Lake and
Charlottetown accords) or series of
administrative agreements (an ap-
proach favored by Marcel Masse) that
would have simultaneously addressed
Quebec's longstanding assorted griev-
ances (e.g., language, culture, immi-
gration, and representation), and
served as a vehicle for fully incorpo-
rating Quebec into the Canadian-fed-
eration (Quebec was the lone provin-
cial dissenter to the Constitution Act
of 1982).
To date, Mr. Chretien and his col-
leagues have yet to assume an activist
role in Quebec provincial affairs. Le-
gions of federal Liberal MPs have not,
for instance, canvassed Quebec in an
attempt to sell the virtues of the
province's continued role in the Cana-
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dian federation. This will, in aillikeli-
hood, decidedly change as a referen-
dum on the future of Quebec and
Canada draws near. Prime Minister
Chretien-will, given his staunch feder-
alist beliefs, be undoubtedly faced with
the necessity of having to fervently
campaign on a pro-Quebec-Canada/
anti-independent-Quebec platform, as
did the Liberal government of Pierre
Trudeau in 1980 (in the face of then
Parti Quebecois Premier Rene
Levesque's sovereignist challenge). In
the course of such a campaign, the
Chretien led team - and other pro-
federalists across Canada - have two
valuable points presently working in
their favor. First, the Quebec provin-
cial election was, according to the ma-
jority of public opinion polls, over-
whelmingly viewed by Quebecers as a
referendum on the state of the
province's economic performance, and
future health - not on whether Que-
necers preferred Confederation or in-
dependence. As The Globe and Mail
put it, the Parti Quebecois was given
"a mandate to govern, not a mandate
to separate." Second, pollsters con-
tinue to solidly demonstrate that ap-
proximately 60% of Quebecers would
vote to stay in Canada - provided the
aforementioned grievances were suffi-
ciently addressed by Ottawa.
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
In the area of Canadian security in-
terests and related military commit-
ments, the Chretien government has
moved to address a number of con-
cerns. Immediately following the elec-
tion, the Prime Minister cancelled the
highly politically charged program
(initiated by the former Conservative
regime) to purchase 43 EH-I01 heli-
copters. The Department of National
Defense (in cooperation with the Min-
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istry of Fisheries, the Ministry of Trans-
portation, and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police) has, at the request of
Brian Tobin, Minister of Fisheries, de-
veloped plans for intercepting and
boarding foreign trawlers that harvest
fish on the fringes of Canada's 200-mile
fishing limit. These vessels are repeat-
edly cited by Ottawa as the principal
source of overfishing and hence re-
sponsible for a corresponding precipi-
tous decline in available fish stocks.
The net results of this planning were
evidenced this past July when fisher-
men aboard the Massachusetts based
scallop draggers, the Warrior and Al-
pha Omega II, were arrested and
charged with violating Canadian fish-
ing regulations. The Liberals have also
supported Canadian participation in
United Nations' led peacekeeping ef-
forts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
and Haiti (forthcoming). In total, some
2,000 Canadian soldiers are stationed
in Bosnia and Croatia, while some 685
armed services personnel are in
Rwanda. Finally, in an effort to un-
ambiguously identify the various roles
and requirements for the Canadian
Armed Forces in the rapidly changing
international political system, Ottawa
(in April 1994) initiated a defense and
foreign policy parliamentary commit-
tee review.
On the diplomatic front, the
Chretien led team has supported the
American sponsored Partnership for
Peace proposal (i.e., "go slow ap-
proach") for extending membership in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
to states in Eastern Europe. It has also
vigorously championed the case of ex-
iled Haitian president Jean Bertrand
Aristide. To this end, Canada has com-
mitted members of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police to aid in maintaining
order on the violence-prone island.
The Chretien government has also
played host to Arab and Israeli diplo-
matic negotiations (February 1994),
provided a $2.5 million technical aid
package to assist Ukrainian authorities
in conducting that country's first
democratic party elections (March
1994), and allocated $10 million in
technical assistance to design and
implement a modern safety regime for
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Russia's rapidly aging nuclear power
facilities. Other issues on the interna-
tional scene that Canada has addressed
in 1994 include: repeated attempts to
persuade Western Hemispheric politi-
cal leaders, particularly U.S. President
Bill Clinton, to end more than three
decades of Cuban isolationism (Canada
recently resumed foreign aid to Cuba);
a commitment of relief assistance in
the sum of $11 million (targeted for
humanitarian purposes such as drink-
ing water, sanitation, shelter, and
health care) for war-ravaged Rwanda;
participation, as observers, in the re-
cent Mexican elections; and, initiatives
intended to broaden and deepen the
scope of Canadian-Chinese/Southeast
Asian trade relations.
The principal international focus for
the Chretien government has, how-
ever, been closer to home: namely, the
United States. Ottawa has been re-
quired, since October 1993, to address
a constant stream of bilateral issues.
The Prime Minister indicated, for ex-
ample, that Canada would not be pre-
pared to officially proclaim the North
American Free Trade Agreement un-
less U.S. authorities were able to meet
outstanding Canadian objectives on a
subsidies code, the process of dispute
settlement, and protective energy and
water measures. These concerns were
ultimately settled to the satisfaction of
Ottawa in late November/early Decem-
ber 1993. "The deal is not perfect," Mr.
Chretien informed an Ottawa news
conference on 2 December, "but I am
very satisfied with the progress we
made." The Prime Minister proceeded
to implement the sectoral free trade
legislation on 30 December. Other
matters have also competed for promi-
nence on the Canadian-American
agenda. According to leading U.S.
brewers and winemakers, American
beer and wine exports to Canada are
subject to unfair, restrictive Canadian
practices such as floor/minimum
prices, inflated distribution costs, and
service fees. In the view of the U.S.
agricultural community, Canadian
peanut and sugar product exports to
the U.S. are unfairly subsidized by Ot-
tawa. Moreover, there are bilateral dif-
ferences on such products as U.S.
poultry and dairy exports (the latter
of which Canada seeks to impose
duties on, anywhere in the neighbor-
hood of 100-326%), and East Coast fish-
inglWest Coast salmon harvesting.
All five of these issue-areas have
throughout 1994 been the subject of
periodic negotiations between Ottawa
and Washington.
On a positive note for the Chretien
government, a binational dispute panel
(established under the terms of the
1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment) ruled in December 1993 that
exports of Canadian softwood to the
United States were not subsidized -
in this case by the province of British
Columbia. In view of the decision, the
U.S. Commerce Department agreed to
eliminate duties of 6.51 % on Canadian
softwood lumber imports. Further-
more, Canadian officials were able to
reach agreement with American au-
thorities on an interim plan to shut-
down the Georges Bank fishery (in
light of pervasive overfishing and a
concomitant decline in fish stocks) for
a period of five months (the pact ex-
pired 1 June 1994). More recently, an
arrangement to govern export levels of
Canadian wheat to the United States
was worked out. The August 1994 pact
permits Canada to ship 1.5 million
tonnes of wheat duty free, or at rela-
tively low tariff rates. Exports exceed-
ing this limit will, with few exceptions,
be subject to prohibitively high tariff
charges.
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This survey of issues that have and
will continue to confront the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Jean Chretien,
suggests that the agenda of the Liberal
Party will continue to be challenging
in the months ahead. If the October
1993 electoral mandate is any indica-
tion, the political success or failure of
the Chretien government will ulti-
mately hinge on the astuteness and
effectiveness of its policies in both the
domestic and international arenas.
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